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Abstract
When attempting to predict future events, people commonly rely on historical data. One psychological char-
acteristic of judgmental forecasting of time series, established by research, is that when people make forecasts
from series, they tend to underestimate future values for upward trends and overestimate them for downward
ones, so-called trend-damping (modeled by anchoring on, and insufficient adjustment from, the average of recent
time series values). Events in a time series can be experienced sequentially (dynamic mode), or they can also
be retrospectively viewed simultaneously (static mode), not experienced individually in real time. In one experi-
ment, we studied the influence of presentation mode (dynamic and static) on two sorts of judgment: (a) predic-
tions of the next event (forecast) and (b) estimation of the average value of all the events in the presented
series (average estimation). Participants’ responses in dynamic mode were anchored on more recent events than
in static mode for all types of judgment but with different consequences; hence, dynamic presentation improved
prediction accuracy, but not estimation. These results are not anticipated by existing theoretical accounts; we
develop and present an agent-based model—the adaptive anchoring model (ADAM)—to account for the differ-
ence between processing sequences of dynamically and statically presented stimuli (visually presented data).
ADAM captures how variation in presentation mode produces variation in responses (and the accuracy of these
responses) in both forecasting and judgment tasks. ADAM’s model predictions for the forecasting and judgment
tasks fit better with the response data than a linear-regression time series model. Moreover, ADAM
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outperformed autoregressive-integrated-moving-average (ARIMA) and exponential-smoothing models, while nei-
ther of these models accounts for people’s responses on the average estimation task.
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1. Introduction
Recent research on decision making from experience suggests that the manner in
which people acquire information affects how they respond to it. Theorists claimed that
how people make risky decisions depends on whether they learned about the decision
outcome values and their likelihoods either by repeatedly sampling the options and expe-
riencing their outcomes, or via summary descriptions of the outcome values and likeli-
hoods (Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004; Hertwig & Erev, 2009; Hertwig &
Pleskac, 2010; Kusev, van Schaik, Alzahrani, Lonigro, & Purser, 2016; Kusev, van
Schaik, Ayton, Dent, & Chater, 2009). Their findings in support of this claim are signifi-
cant because, although in life many choices are made without the benefit of descriptions
of the likelihoods of the possible outcomes, nearly all the experimental research studying
risky decision making has evaluated how people respond to described decisions1
(De Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007).
Events in a time series can be experienced sequentially (dynamic mode), or they can
also be viewed simultaneously (static mode), not experienced individually in real time.
Outside the laboratory, decisions are usually based on experience; often people learn
about the likelihoods of decision outcomes through repeatedly making choices and experi-
encing the outcomes. Some of the differences between experience-based and description-
based decision making also apply to some forms of judgment. For example, sometimes
people attempting to forecast from a time series of events will examine a complete series
of historical data (e.g., recent sales performance) and attempt to predict the next event.
Commonly, however, forecasters live through the sequence of events and, rather than
inspecting a complete and static sequence, will experience a time series of events dynam-
ically as they occur over time. In the latter case, as in learning about decisions from
experience, the events in the time series are experienced sequentially in the context pro-
vided by subsequent events. In the former case, the events in the time series are not expe-
rienced individually over time, but they are reviewed retrospectively and can immediately
be viewed holistically such that any overall pattern will be immediately apparent, as with
learning about decisions from descriptions. Nevertheless, in both situations forecasters
refer to exactly the same data points to predict the next event.
As decisions from experience differ from decisions from description, this plainly raises
the issue as to how judgment from experience might differ from judgment from description;
specifically, does the mode of encountering time series influence judgment as it does deci-
sion making? One psychological characteristic of judgmental forecasting of time series
established by research is that when people make forecasts from series, they tend to under-
estimate future values for upward trends and overestimate them for downward ones, so-
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called trend-damping (Andreassen & Kraus, 1990; Bolger & Harvey, 1993; Eggleton,
1982; Keren, 1983; Lawrence & Makridakis, 1989; Reimers & Harvey, 2011; Sanders,
1992; Wagenaar & Sagaria, 1975; Wagenaar & Timmers, 1978). Research has also offered
a number of theoretical explanations as to why trend-damping may occur (Lawrence, Good-
win, O’Connor, & €Onkal, 2006; Lawrence & O’Connor, 1992) and demonstrated that
trend-damping can be modeled (a) by anchoring on, and (insufficient) adjustment from, the
average of recent time series values (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) or (b) by contextual
adaptation to features of the environment—with steeper trends causing trend-damping and
shallower trends leading to anti-damping in behavioral forecasts (Harvey & Reimers,
2013). Here, we investigate whether both judgments of the average and judgmental fore-
casting of time series are affected by variation in the way in which people experience infor-
mation, when either retrospectively reviewing a time series or experiencing it one event at
a time. Given that trend-damping reflects some psychological strategy, we aimed to deter-
mine if and how it varies across different ways of encountering a time series. Previous
research has demonstrated that judgments are sensitive to contextual properties of experi-
enced events (Kusev, Tsaneva-Atanasova, van Schaik, & Chater, 2012; Kusev et al., 2011);
experiencing a sequence of events serially (dynamically) one at a time necessarily draws
attention to each individual event. Consequently, this may increase the tendency to anchor
on the most salient events for experienced sequences more than for described sequences.
2. Predictions and model development
A commonly expressed view in memory and cognition research is that the representation
of events stored in memory is highly dependent on the mode of psychological processing
used in encoding the events (Bogen & Gazzaniga, 1965; Dunn, 1985; Dunn & Reddix,
1991; Levy, Trevarthen, & Sperry, 1972; Levy-Agresti & Sperry, 1968; Tucker, 1981). One
mode is traditionally considered to be analytic and logical in its processing (e.g., processing
individual events, dynamically, one at a time), while the other mode processes information
in a more holistic or Gestalt manner (e.g., processing the events, statically, at once) (Dunn,
1985; Dunn & Reddix, 1991; Levy et al., 1972; Levy-Agresti & Sperry, 1968; Masuda &
Nisbett, 2001; Nisbett & Miyamoto, 2006; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001;
Tucker, 1981; Van Belle, de Graef, Verfaillie, Busigny, & Rossion, 2010). Accordingly, we
propose that forecasters, in their predictions, rely on a small sample of recent events (e.g.,
the most recent event from dynamically experienced sequences) or “average” representa-
tions of the whole time series from statically experienced sequences (e.g., Deese & Kauf-
man, 1957; Harvey & Reimers, 2013; Murdock, 1962; Postman & Phillips, 1965). However,
neither empirical nor theoretical research provides evidence as to whether dynamically
experienced sequences facilitate a general cognitive and behavioral advantage.
It is plausible that forecasting accuracy is enhanced by dynamically experienced
sequences of events (where success accuracy is informed by the most recent event).
Specifically, where events are presented with dynamic sequences (e.g., self-paced value-
by-value presentation of a series with all previous values visible at all times or self-paced
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value-by-value presentation of a series with the last value only visible at any one time),
forecasting accuracy may be induced, drawing the respondents’ attention to each individ-
ual event; hence, anchoring on the most recent/salient event occurs. In contrast, where
events are presented with static sequences (one simultaneous presentation of all values of
a series), forecasting errors may be induced (drawing the respondents’ attention on the
“average” event with insufficient adjustment to the most recent event). This assumption is
novel, intriguing, intuitive, and worth exploring.
However, presentation by way of either dynamic or static trends (time series) does not
only influence forecasting. Accordingly, in this article we further explored the influence
of two sorts of judgment: (a) predictions of the next event (forecast—where the focus is
on the next event in time series), and (b) estimation of the average value of all the events
in the presented series (average estimation—where the focus is on the “average” event in
time series). It is likely that participants’ responses in dynamic mode are anchored on
more recent events than in static mode for all types of judgment (forecasting and average
estimations), but with different consequences on judgment accuracy: dynamic presentation
would improve prediction accuracy, but not estimation.
Accordingly, we assume that behavioral differences in the judgment of information
may emerge as a result of the presentation mode of experienced (dynamic or static)
sequences of perceptual information in the task and type of judgment (forecasting or esti-
mation). In the present article, for the purpose of developing a unified model to account
for the different modes of presentation, the terms dynamic and static will be used opera-
tionally to describe different presentations modes that are experienced, based on statically
presented (described) and dynamically presented (experienced) sequences.
To comprehensively account for the effect of presentation mode for two types of judg-
ment, we developed an agent-based model—the adaptive anchoring model (ADAM),
inspired by the memory-based scaling model (Petrov & Anderson, 2005). Anchoring in
the model is scaled via a stimulus parameter representing the type of experience and
judgment task. We note that this is not a free parameter but attains a rather well-defined
value that accounts for the context of information presentation. The model is adaptive in
the sense that it takes into account the extent of match between judgment task and experi-
ence type. In particular, in constructing the model we aim to account for people’s
responses in forecasting and judgment tasks across combinations of different presentation
modes, trend directions, and trend consistency. First, presentation mode (described and
experienced) will have an effect on participants’ response: With static presentation the
series average will be strongly weighted in the response (“average” event), but with
dynamic presentation the last trend value will be strongly weighted in the response. Sec-
ond, the judgment task would have an effect: In the forecasting task the last trend value
will be strongly weighted in the response, but in the judgment task the series average will
be strongly weighted in the response. Hence, we include in the model a predictor (param-
eter) that accounts for the distribution of weights, depending on the context of the data
presentation and judgment task.
In our model, we use a single idealized item stimulus Si, which depends on the type of
the experience: i = s (static), i = dt (dynamic with trend), or i = dc (dynamic with only the
4 P. Kusev et al. / Cognitive Science (2017)
current value presented). In the case of static experience, Ss = 0.35 (the normalized mean
of the experimental sequence), whereas in the case of dynamic experience Sdt = Sdc = nor-
malized last element of the experimental sequence with range [0; 1]. The task effect in the
model is represented by an idealized task item (Tk), which depends on the experimental
task, k = j (judging average) or f (forecasting). In particular, in the case of judgment
Tj = 0.35 (the normalized mean of the experimental sequence), and in the case of dynamic
experimental setting Tf = normalized last element of the experimental sequence.
Next, the similarity between the stimulus and the task is assumed to depend exponen-
tially on the distance between them (Myung, Pitt, & Navarro, 2007). To take account of
the trend in the model, we do not use the absolute value of the distance between stimulus
and task item; we also normalize the values of the stimulus and task items such that Si
and Tk 2 (0, 1). Hence, the similarity weight (SWik) depends on the distance between an
idealized item stimulus Si and an idealized task item (Tk). Specifically, we calculate the
similarity weight using the following exponential representation:
SWik ¼ expððSi  TkÞÞ ð1Þ
In addition, we take into account an experience-dependent anchor, EAi, i = s (static)
i = dt (historic-dynamic, i.e., dynamic with trend), or i = dc (momentary-dynamic, i.e.,
dynamic with current value only). In the case of static experience EAs = 3,500 (the mean
of the experimental sequence), whereas in the case of dynamic experience
EAdt = EAdc = last element of the experimental sequence.
Furthermore, the similarity weight scales the magnitude of the behavioral response
depending on the distance between the stimulus and the task target; in other words, it rep-
resents critical factors that may act in relation to the position of the stimulus. The stimuli
in our experiments are time series bars with heights (representing quantities) and the task
of the observers is to judge the average and forecast the next trend value (both tasks
using response bars with heights). This is a similar version to some of the abstractions
implicit in multidimensional scaling (Schiffman, Reynolds, & Young, 1981) and distance-
based similarity metrics (Nosofsky, 1992).
Finally, as suggested by the memory-based scaling model (Petrov & Anderson, 2005),
we take into account perceptual noise (to account for individual perceptual variability
among participants). Hence, the behavioral response (BRik) in the model is a Gaussian ran-
dom variable whose mean and variance depend on the stimulus-task similarity weight, SWik,
as well as the experience-dependent anchor, EAi, and is given by the following product:
BRik ¼ SWik  EAi  ð1þ kpxpÞ; ð2Þ
where kp is a dimensionless coefficient of proportionality and xp is a random variable with
zero mean and unit variance (Petrov & Anderson, 2005). We note that Eq. 2 can be consid-
ered a stochastic version of the linear regression equations used in previous research on fore-
casting and judgment where the anchor point depends on specific properties of the time
series used in the experiments (Lawrence & O’Connor, 1992, 1995). However, our model
takes into account the similarity between task and type of experience.
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3. Experiment
We expect that human forecasting and average estimation are informed by the most
recent event from dynamically experienced sequences (dynamic mode) or “average” rep-
resentations of the whole time series from statically experienced sequences (static mode),
with different consequences on judgment accuracy. Specifically, we predict a fourfold
pattern of judgment accuracy: (a) enhanced forecasting accuracy with dynamic mode
(where success accuracy will be informed by the most recent event), (b) induced average
estimation errors with dynamic mode (recency), (c) induced forecasting errors with static
mode (drawing the respondents’ attention on the “average” event with insufficient adjust-
ment to the most recent event), and (d) enhanced average estimation accuracy with static
mode (one simultaneous presentation of all values of a series).
Accordingly, an experiment was designed to establish the effects of presentation mode
of experiencing a time series and judgment tasks on behavioral response, and to evaluate
the difference between the behavioral response data and model predictions from ADAM,
linear regression, autoregressive-integrated-moving-average (ARIMA), and exponential
smoothing models. Two sorts of judgment were studied: (a) predictions of the next event
(forecasting), and (b) estimation of the average value of all the events in the presented
series (average estimation). We chose these two judgment tasks as they are somewhat
disparate; plausibly, they will invoke diverse processing strategies requiring differential
attention to features of the time series (trends, distribution, volatility) that may be differ-
entially influenced by the mode of experiencing time series.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
One thousand six hundred and twenty participants (876 female; Mage = 42, SD = 13)
were recruited through a recruitment service of online survey panels. They took part indi-
vidually and received a payment of £1. All participants were treated in accordance with
the British Psychological Society’s code of human research ethics.
3.1.2. Stimuli and equipment
An interactive computer program for judgments and forecasting was developed and used.
Three time series (linear positive trend with superimposed noise, linear negative trend with
superimposed noise and stationary noise only; see Fig. 1A–C) of monetary values were
generated. The three time series can be described with Eqs. 3–5, respectively:
YðtÞ ¼ 3; 000þ 21:28 t þ n: ð3Þ
YðtÞ ¼ 4; 000 21:28 t þ n: ð4Þ
YðtÞ ¼ 3; 500þ n; ð5Þ
where t = 1, . . ., 48, and n followed a normal distribution with mean = 0 and
variance = 10.
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3.1.3. Design and procedure
A 3 9 3 9 2 independent-measures experimental design was used. The first indepen-
dent variable was trend direction; this was positive linear trend with superimposed
Gaussian noise, negative trend with superimposed Gaussian noise, or stationary series
A. Positive trend.
B. Negative trend.
C. Stationary series.
SALARY /
AMMOUNT
MONTHS
SALARY /
AMMOUNT
MONTHS
SALARY /
AMMOUNT
MONTHS
Fig. 1. Time series used in the experiment.
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(Gaussian noise only). The second independent variable was presentation mode; this was
historic-dynamic (self-paced value-by-value presentation of a series with all previous val-
ues visible at all times), momentary-dynamic (self-paced value-by-value presentation of a
series with only the last value visible at any one time), or static (one simultaneous pre-
sentation of all values of a series). The third independent variable was trend consistency;
this was consistent or inconsistent. In consistent trends, 48 data points were presented,
according to Eqs. 3–5. In inconsistent trends, 49 data points were presented; after 48
points according to Eqs. 3–5, the mean value of 3,500 followed, producing an inconsis-
tent continuation of positive and negative trends. Participants were asked to make only
two judgments (no multiple forecasts and estimations) from the time series: a prediction
of the next event, and a judgment of the average value in the series after being presented
with the entire 48 or 49 data points.
Accordingly, the first dependent variable was forecasting error. This was relative to the
next predicted value from the appropriate regression model—(3), (4), or (5) for consistent
trends and with adjusted model parameter values to account for inconsistent trends with
an additional 49th data point. The second dependent variable was error in the judged
average value (relative to the true mean, which was the same for all series).
Participants were told that the time series represented the average monthly earnings (in
pounds sterling) of employees in one company over 48 or 49 months. In the static presen-
tation the whole series was displayed at once (with no behavioral dynamic task engage-
ment). In contrast, tasks with dynamic presentation required participants to click a button
(labeled “Next Month”) to observe each month’s salaries, with previous values remaining
on the screen (in historic-dynamic presentation) or not (in momentary-dynamic presenta-
tion). Therefore, all values of the series were presented in both the static and dynamic
conditions before any type of judgment was required to be made by the participants. In
each presentation condition, while the whole series (for static and historic-dynamic pre-
sentation) or the final value (for momentary-dynamic presentation) was displayed,
participants had to (a) predict the next value in the series (by clicking at their chosen
position on a vertical line), and (b) estimate the average salary over the presented 48 or
49 months (again, by clicking). These two tasks (performed only once) were presented in
random order for each participant and without training.
3.2. Results and discussion
We first present an exploratory analysis of the first two dependent variables, before
analyzing each of the two dependent variables in detail. We found that the mode of pre-
sentation (historic-dynamic, momentary-dynamic, or static) affected judgment of both
dependent variables (error of behavioral forecasting and average estimation), but the
effect was moderated by trend direction and trend consistency.
3.2.1. Exploratory analysis
The correlation between forecasting and estimation was low, r = .05, and non-
significant p > .05. The pattern of mean values for the two tasks (see Fig. 2A,B) indicates
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A. Prediction.
B. Average-estimation.
Fig. 2. Means values for dependent variables in the experiment. Error bars represent 95% confidence interval
of the mean.
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that forecasting performance was more influenced by trend direction than estimation per-
formance and this influence was most pronounced under dynamic presentation (historic or
momentary) and with consistent trends. In particular, the forecasting response seemed to
be more strongly influenced by the final values in the series than the estimation response.
Thus, performance on the two tasks was genuinely different and further analysis in terms
of error of forecasting and average estimation was subsequently conducted. Furthermore,
the pattern of results is consistent with the idea that under static presentation, the whole
presented series is taken into account to a larger extent when a response is made. In con-
trast, under (in particular historic-) dynamic presentation of consistent trend series, the
most recent value in the series is more heavily weighted in the behavioral forecasting and
estimation of the average responses.
3.2.2. Forecasting
Overall, the following behavioral forecasting results reveal that dynamic presentation
aids the forecasting accuracy of consistent trends. Fig. 3 shows the prediction error (cal-
culated as the difference between response value and predicted next trend value from the
regression equation of the trend that was presented) and illustrates that forecasting was
more accurate with dynamic presentations than with static presentation. One-way analysis
of variance (ANOVA) comparing the mean absolute error rate in the forecasts confirmed a
significant difference between the three presentation conditions, F(2, 1617) = 18.08,
Fig. 3. Prediction error. Error bars represent 95% confidence interval of the mean.
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e2 = .02, p < .001. Post hoc tests (Tukey’s HSD) confirmed that participants experiencing
historic-dynamic presentation series were significantly more accurate forecasters than par-
ticipants experiencing static presentation (95%-confidence interval of mean differ-
ence = [51.49; 117.50]) or momentary-dynamic presentation (95%-confidence
interval = [13.20; 79.21]).
Trend-damping was evident for each presentation mode—future salary was under-pre-
dicted for a positive trend and over-predicted for a negative trend. However, these ten-
dencies were both markedly reduced with dynamic presentation in consistent trends,
resulting in improved forecasting with the dynamic presentation mode (see Fig. 3). A
3 9 3 9 2 ANOVA (Table 1, Panel 1) on the signed forecast errors confirmed that the
effect of trend direction and the interaction effect of trend direction and presentation
mode on forecasting error were statistically significant, but—unsurprisingly—given the
net effect of positive and negative errors, the main effect of presentation mode was not.
However, the interaction effect of trend consistency and trend direction was also signifi-
cant, with the effect of direction stronger for inconsistent trends, as was the three-way
interaction of trend direction, presentation mode, and trend consistency with the interac-
tion effect of direction and presentation mode only apparent for consistent trends.
Given the significant three-way interaction, follow-up 3 9 3 ANOVAs analyzed the
effect of trend direction and presentation on forecasting error for each trend consistency.
For inconsistent trends (Table 1, Panel 2), the main effect of trend direction was signifi-
cant, but the main effect of presentation mode and the interaction effect were not. For
consistent trends (Table 1, Panel 3), the effect of trend direction, F(2, 801) = 194.65,
e2 = .30, p < .001, and the interaction effect of trend direction and presentation mode on
forecasting error were again statistically significant, but—unsurprisingly—given the net
effect of positive and negative errors, the main effect of presentation mode was not. Sim-
ple effect tests (univariate ANOVA) showed that with consistent trends the effect of trend
direction was significant for both static (Table 1, Panel 4) and dynamic presentations,
though with a smaller effect size for the latter (see Table 1, Panel 5 [momentary-
dynamic] and Table 1, Panel 6 [for historic-dynamic]).
Further simple effect tests showed that with consistent trends the effect of presentation
mode on forecasting error was significant for the stationary series (Table 1, Panel 7), for
the positive trend (Table 1, Panel 8) and for the negative trend (Table 1, Panel 9). Post
hoc tests (Tukey’s HSD) corroborated the behavioral advantage (forecasting accuracy)
with experience of dynamic presentation modes. Compared to the static presentations, the
dynamic presentations significantly reduced under-predicting of positive trends (95%-
confidence interval of mean difference = [343.73; 146.38] for historic-dynamic, and
95%-confidence interval = [241.55; 44.19] for momentary-dynamic) and over-predict-
ing of negative trends (95%-confidence interval = [127.54; 296.01] for historic-dynamic
and 95%-confidence interval = [92.90; 261.37] for momentary-dynamic).
These results (see also Fig. 3) demonstrate more behavioral adjustment toward the final
(and most recent) values in the conditions where the trend series are dynamic and consis-
tent. Specifically, the increase in forecasting accuracy for dynamic presentation is due to
reduced trend-damping; the dynamic presentation of trend series draws forecasters’
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Table 1
Analysis of variance—prediction error
Source df F p e2
Panel 1: 3 9 3 9 2 analysis, all conditions
Presentation mode 2 1.64 .194 .00
Direction 2 1,029.76 .000 .51
Length 1 1.93 .165 .00
Presentation by direction 4 14.49 .000 .01
Presentation by length 2 0.75 .474 .00
Direction by length 2 118.06 .000 .06
Presentation by direction by length 4 11.85 .000 .01
Residual 1,602
Total 1,619
Panel 2: 3 9 3 analysis, inconsistent trend
Presentation mode 2 0.28 .756 .00
Direction 2 1,120.04 .000 .73
Presentation by direction 4 1.24 .292 .00
Residual 801
Total 809
Panel 3: 3 9 3 analysis, consistent trend
Presentation mode 2 1.83 .161 .00
Direction 2 194.65 .000 .30
Presentation by direction 4 21.45 .000 .07
Residual 801
Total 809
Panel 4: One-way analysis, consistent trend, static presentation
Direction 2 114.00 .000 .46
Residual 267
Total 269
Panel 5: One-way analysis, consistent trend, momentary-dynamic presentation (last value only)
Direction 2 27.49 .000 .17
Residual 267
Total 269
Panel 6: One-way analysis, consistent trend, historic-dynamic presentation
Direction 2 56.27 .000 .29
Residual 267
Total 269
Panel 7: One-way analysis, consistent trend, stationary series
Presentation mode 2 4.41 .013 .03
Residual 267
Total 269
Panel 8: One-way analysis, consistent trend, positive trend
Presentation mode 2 17.29 .000 .11
Residual 267
Total 269
Panel 9: One-way analysis, consistent trend, negative trend
Presentation mode 2 20.20 .000 .13
Residual 267
Total 269
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attention to a smaller subset of more recently experienced events. For trended series,
more recent events are closer to the normatively correct value than less recent events, so
anchoring on more recent values would result in more accurate forecasts.
3.2.3. Average-estimation
In contrast to the behavioral forecasting results, the average-estimation judgments
results reveal that static presentation aids the average-estimation accuracy of consistent
trends. Average salary was generally underestimated (Fig. 4), but not for the consistent
positive trends with dynamic presentation. One-way ANOVA comparing the mean absolute
error rate in average estimation demonstrated no significant difference between the three
presentation modes, F < 1.
With dynamic presentation, there was a difference in the signed error between the positive
and negative trended series, suggesting again anchoring on a subset of more recent events. A
3 9 3 9 2 ANOVA (Table 2, Panel 1) on the signed average-estimation errors confirmed that
the effect of trend direction and the interaction effect of trend direction and presentation
mode on error in the judged average value were statistically significant. Unsurprisingly, given
the net effect of positive and negative errors, the main effect of presentation mode was not.
However, the interaction effect of trend consistency and trend direction was also significant,
with the effect of direction stronger for consistent trends. Moreover, the three-way interaction
of trend direction, presentation mode, and trend consistency was significant too, with the
interaction effect of direction and presentation mode only apparent for consistent trends.
Fig. 4. Average-estimation error. Error bars represent 95% confidence interval of the mean.
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Table 2
Analysis of variance—average-estimation error
Source df F p e2
Panel 1: 3 9 3 9 2 analysis, all conditions
Presentation mode 2 0.36 .695 .00
Direction 2 61.45 .000 .06
Length 1 0.14 .705 .00
Presentation by direction 4 11.30 .000 .02
Presentation by length 2 0.08 .919 .00
Direction by length 2 42.40 .000 .04
Presentation by direction by length 4 8.02 .000 .02
Residual 1,602
Total 1,619
Panel 2: 3 9 3 analysis, inconsistent trend
Presentation mode 2 0.13 .877 .00
Direction 2 1.85 .157 .00
Presentation by direction 4 0.30 .878 .00
Residual 801
Total 809
Panel 3: 3 9 3 analysis, consistent trend
Presentation mode 2 0.31 .733 .00
Direction 2 99.20 .000 .18
Presentation by direction 4 18.50 .000 .07
Residual 801
Total 809
Panel 4: One-way analysis, consistent trend, static presentation
Direction 2 0.58 .561 .00
Residual 267
Total 269
Panel 5: One-way analysis, consistent trend, momentary-dynamic presentation (last value only)
Direction 2 62.37 .000 .32
Residual 267
Total 269
Panel 6: One-way analysis, consistent trend, historic-dynamic presentation
Direction 2 83.53 .000 .38
Residual 267
Total 269
Panel 7: One-way analysis, consistent trend, stationary series
Presentation mode 2 0.37 .692 .00
Residual 267
Total 269
Panel 8: One-way analysis, consistent trend, positive trend
Presentation mode 2 14.38 .000 .09
Residual 267
Total 269
Panel 9: One-way analysis, consistent trend, negative trend
Presentation mode 2 20.95 .000 .13
Residual 267
Total 269
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Given the significant three-way interaction, follow-up 3 9 3 ANOVA s analyzed the effect
of trend direction and presentation on error in the judged average value for each trend con-
sistency. For inconsistent trends (Table 2, Panel 2), neither the main effect of trend direc-
tion nor the main effect of presentation mode nor the interaction effect was significant. For
consistent trends (Table 2, Panel 3), the effect of trend direction and the interaction effect
of trend direction and presentation mode were again statistically significant, but—unsur-
prisingly—given the net effect of positive and negative errors, the main effect of presenta-
tion mode was not. Simple effect tests (univariate ANOVA) showed that with consistent
trends the effect of trend direction on error in the judged average value was not significant
for static presentation (Table 2, Panel 4), but was significant for both dynamic presenta-
tions—momentary-dynamic (Table 2, Panel 5) and historic-dynamic (Table 2, Panel 6).
Further simple effect tests showed that with consistent trends the effect of presentation
mode on error in the judged average value was significant for the positive trend (Table 2,
Panel 8) and the negative trend (Table 2, Panel 9), but not for the stationary series (Table 2,
Panel 7). Post hoc tests (Tukey’s HSD) corroborated the behavioral advantage (accuracy of
average estimation) with experience of static presentation mode. Compared to the dynamic
presentations, static presentations significantly reduced over-estimation of positive trends
(95%-confidence interval of mean difference = [254.34; 89.68] for historic-dynamic,
and 95%-confidence interval = [232.61; 67.95] for momentary-dynamic) and under-
estimation of negative trends (95%-confidence interval = [108.39; 256.19] for historic-
dynamic and 95%-confidence interval = [94.58; 242.38] for momentary-dynamic).
4. Model assessment
4.1. How the ADAM predicts behavioral forecasting and average-estimation
The task-specific subsystems of ADAM were implemented in a MATLAB program
(http://uk.mathworks.com) that takes experimentally presented sequences (3)–(5) as inputs
and produces behavioral responses as outputs. The model performance is thus directly
comparable to the human data and is tested in a simulation experiment that replicates the
behavioral experiment.
We statistically tested model predictions against the response data. First, in the case
when kp = 0 (without Gaussian noise), the model is deterministic and generates constant
predictions as BRik is calculated according to (2). We note that in the case of forecasting
under dynamic presentation we have the last element of the experimental sequence as a
model prediction and in the case of average-estimation judgment under static presenta-
tion the model predicts the mean of the experimental sequence as a behavioral response.
Second, in the case when kp 6¼ 0, the model takes into account individual variability.
Hence, we can simulate the responses given in the experiment better and compare the
average predicted in the model with the experimentally observed averages for each
experimental condition. In our simulations, we used kp = .04 as estimated in the mem-
ory-based scaling model (Petrov & Anderson, 2005). For each experimental condition
P. Kusev et al. / Cognitive Science (2017) 15
(n = 90) and each of two values of the model parameter kp (0 and .04), we generated 90
model predictions that were to be compared with the 90 actual response data in that con-
dition.
Unrelated t tests were used to assess the difference ([lack of] fit) between response
data and model (ADAM) predictions. Fig. 5 shows the effect sizes for different combi-
nations of trend direction, presentation mode, and trend consistency. With kp = 0, 8 out
of 18 differences were significant for forecasting, as were 6 of 18 for judgment.
According to Cohen’s (1988) conventions for effect size r, average effect size was
small (M = .14 [SD = .13] for forecasting and mean = .12 [SD = .11] for average esti-
mation), but not negligible and indicating a lack of fit between response data and
model. For forecasting, model fit was poorest in experimental conditions with momen-
tary-dynamic presentation of positive trend and negative inconsistent trend, and historic-
dynamic presentation of positive and negative consistent trend. For judgment, fit was
poorest in experimental conditions with (historic- or momentary-) dynamic presentation
of consistent positive trend.
With kp = .04, none of the differences was significant, all p > .05 (and |t| < 1 for 16
out of 18 combinations). Average effect size was extremely small and consistent across
the 18 experimental conditions, M = SD = .03, for forecasting, M = SD = .02, for judg-
ment, indicating an excellent fit. The source of the data (our human participants or
ADAM) explained hardly any variance: <.01% of variance in forecasting data and <.05%
of variance in average estimation data—again evidence for a good fit.
Further evidence for the advantage for the simulation with model parameter kp = .04
comes from comparisons between simulations with kp = .04 and those with kp = 0. Of
the 14 conditions where the mean of the response data differed significantly from the
mean of the simulation results with kp = 0, 10 conditions also showed a significant differ-
ence between the simulation results with kp = .04 and those with kp = 0 at the .05 signifi-
cance level, and another three conditions showed a significant difference at the .10 level.
An explanation for the difference in results is that the model with kp = .04 represents a
degree of individual variability, whereas model with kp = 0 represents no variability at
all. In fact, in the current dataset Petrov and Anderson’s (2005) parameter value kp = .04
produced variability in the series of model predictions that was very close to variability
in the series of the actual data, mean of SD ratio = 1.00 (SD of SD ratio = 0.12) for fore-
casting and mean of SD ratio = 1.00 (SD of SD ratio = 0.11) for average estimation. Fur-
ther confirmation of this finding comes from the Levene’s test results showing that the
assumption of equality of variance was not violated in any of the 18 experimental condi-
tions. Given that fit between model and data was substantially better with kp = .04 com-
pared to kp = 0 (see also Fig. 5), kp = .04 was used in the following assessment of model
predictions.
Cross-validation within the large sample (N = 1,620) was undertaken by randomly
splitting the sample for each experimental condition (n = 90) in two subsamples
(45 + 45). 2 9 2 ANOVA was then conducted with independent variables series (re-
sponse data or model predictions) and subsample for both tasks. The main purpose of
the analysis was, first, to establish that the interaction effect was not significant
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Fig. 5. Effect size r of comparisons between response data and model predictions (ADAM). (A) The model
simulations were performed with perceptual noise parameter k = 0.04 and (B) the model simulations were
performed with perceptual noise parameter k = 0. Model comparisons: Exp (presentation mode): 0 static (one
simultaneous presentation of all values of a series]), 1 historic-dynamic [self-paced value-by-value
presentation of a series with all previous values visible at all times], and 2 momentary-dynamic (self-paced
value-by-value presentation of a series with only the last value visible at any one time). Dist (trend direction):
0 stationary series (Gaussian noise only), 1 positive linear trend with superimposed Gaussian noise, and 2
negative trend with superimposed Gaussian noise. Length (trend consistency): 48 according to Eqs. 1–3 or
49, where the mean value of 3,500 was inserted at the end of a series of 48—an inconsistent continuation of
positive and negative trends.
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(showing that the effect of series, and thereby fit between response data and model
predictions, was not different between the two samples) and that the main effect of
series was not significant (indicating a good model fit). For none of the experimental
conditions were the interaction effect or the main effect of series significant, all
p > .05, thereby providing evidence for consistency of model fit across subsamples
within the dataset.
4.2. Predicting behavioral response with a linear-regression time series model
Model fit was further assessed through comparison by way of statistical testing of the
predicted next trend value against response data. As a comparison, the same type of anal-
ysis was conducted comparing response data with the predicted next trend value (see
Fig. 6). To represent individual variability (IV) in task performance in the same way as
in the model with kp = .04, the predicted value was weighted by a random process as in
Eq. 2:
PVikðtÞ ¼ YðtÞ  ð1þ kpnpÞ ð6Þ
Fig. 6 shows the effect sizes for different combinations of trend direction, presentation
mode, and trend consistency. Twelve out of 18 differences were significant for forecasting
and 7 of 18 for average estimation. Average effect size was large for forecasting, M = .46,
SD = .36, and mid-sized for average estimation, M = .19, SD = .23, indicating a poor fit
and a lack of consistency of fit across experimental conditions. For forecasting, fit was
extremely poor in experimental conditions with static presentation of positive or negative
trends, historic-dynamic presentation of positive inconsistent and negative inconsistent
trends, and momentary-dynamic presentation of positive inconsistent and negative incon-
sistent trends. Fit was also poor for momentary-dynamic presentation of consistent positive
and negative trends, and dynamic-historic presentation of the consistent positive trend. For
average estimation, fit was extremely poor in conditions with (historic- or momentary-)
dynamic presentation of the negative trend. Fit was also poor for historic- and momentary-
dynamic presentation of the consistent positive trend as well as historic-dynamic presenta-
tion of the stationary trend. These results demonstrate that a linear-regression time series
model that describes the trend that is presented and generates the predicted next trend
value is a poor model of people’s response. In addition, it is notable that even the model
of (2) with kp = 0 performed better than the predicted next trend value, the model of (6)
(compare Fig. 5 with Fig. 6).2
As a further comparison, the same type of analysis was conducted comparing model
predictions of (2) with the model predictions of (6), the predicted next trend value (see
Fig. 6). The results were almost identical to those of the previous comparison between
the response data and the model predictions from (6), thereby indirectly providing further
evidence for the excellent fit between the response data and model predictions of (2) and
a poor fit between the response data and model of predictions of (6).
18 P. Kusev et al. / Cognitive Science (2017)
Fig. 6. Effect size r of comparisons between response data and model predictions (Linear-regression time
series model). (A) The model simulations were performed with perceptual noise parameter k = 0.04 and (B)
the model simulations were performed with perceptual noise parameter k = 0. Model comparisons: Exp (pre-
sentation mode): 0 static (one simultaneous presentation of all values of a series), 1 historic-dynamic (self-
paced value-by-value presentation of a series with all previous values visible at all times), and 2 momentary-
dynamic (self-paced value-by-value presentation of a series with only the last value visible at any one time).
Dist (trend direction): 0 stationary series (Gaussian noise only), 1 positive linear trend with superimposed
Gaussian noise, and 2 negative trend with superimposed Gaussian noise. Length (trend consistency): 48
according to Eqs. 1–3 or 49, where the mean value of 3,500 was inserted at the end of a series of 48—an
inconsistent continuation of positive and negative trends.
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4.3. Predicting behavioral forecasting with ARIMA and exponential-smoothing
algorithms
Previous research (e.g., Andreassen & Kraus, 1990; Box, Jenkins, & Reinsel, 1994;
Bunn & Wright, 1991; Gardner, 1985; Gardner & McKenzie, 1985; Lawrence, Edmund-
son, & O’Connor, 1985; Lawrence & O’Connor, 1992, 1995) has used ARIMA and expo-
nential-smoothing algorithms to explore and model people’s forecasting behavior. We
therefore compared these algorithms with ADAM. We statistically tested model predic-
tions from an ARIMA (1, 0, 0) model (first-order autoregressive model, also known as
Box–Jenkins model [Box et al., 1994]) and those from an exponential-smoothing algo-
rithm (Gardner, 1985; Gardner & McKenzie, 1985) against the response data. For each
experimental condition (n = 90), we generated 90 model predictions from Eqs. 3 (for an
increasing trend), 4 (for a decreasing trend), or 5 (for a stationary trend) that were to be
compared with the 90 actual response data in that condition.
Fig. 7 shows the effect sizes for different combinations of trend direction, presentation
mode, and trend consistency. For ARIMA(1, 0, 0), 13 of 18 differences were significant
Fig. 7. Effect size r of comparisons between response data (forecasting only) and model predictions (ARIMA
and exponential smoothing models). Model comparisons: Exp (presentation mode): 0 static (one simultaneous
presentation of all values of a series), 1 historic-dynamic (self-paced value-by-value presentation of a series with
all previous values visible at all times), and 2 momentary-dynamic (self-paced value-by-value presentation of a
series with only the last value visible at any one time). Dist (trend direction): 0 stationary series (Gaussian noise
only), 1 positive linear trend with superimposed Gaussian noise, and 2 negative trend with superimposed Gaus-
sian noise. Length (trend consistency): 48 according to Eqs. 1–3 or 49, where the mean value of 3,500 was
inserted at the end of a series of 48—an inconsistent continuation of positive and negative trends.
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for forecasting. The average effect size r was medium (M = .51 [SD = .39]), indicating a
lack of fit between response data and model. Model fit was poorest in experimental con-
ditions with momentary-dynamic or historic-dynamic presentation of positive and nega-
tive trends or inconsistent trends, and with static presentation of consistent or inconsistent
positive or negative trends. For exponential smoothing the pattern of results was the
same, with the same 13 out of 18 differences significant for forecasting. The average
effect size r was medium (M = .53 [SD = .39]), indicating a lack of fit between response
data and model. Model fit was poorest for the same conditions as with ARIMA(1, 0, 0).
In sum, ARIMA and exponential-smoothing models poorly fit our behavioral response
data.
4.4. Model comparisons: ADAM, ARIMA, and exponential smoothing
Next, we statistically compared model predictions of ADAM, ARIMA(1, 0, 0), and
exponential smoothing. We found that, overall, ADAM’s prediction differs significantly
from those of ARIMA(1, 0, 0), t(3238) = 2.86, p < .01, r = .05, and exponential
smoothing, t(3238) = 2.74, p < .01, r = .05, but ARIMA and exponential smoothing do
not differ significantly, |t| < 1, r = .00. The biggest differences between ADAM and
ARIMA(1, 0, 0) were observed for static presentation of both consistent and inconsistent
increasing and decreasing trends, and for historic and momentary dynamic presentation of
inconsistent increasing and decreasing trends.
As a further comparison, model predictions of ARIMA(1, 0, 0) and exponential
smoothing were compared, with the predicted next trend value from a linear-regression
time series model. The results show that, overall, the prediction of neither of the model
differs significantly from the predicted next trend value |t| < 1. In sum, the predictions of
ARIMA and exponential-smoothing models differ substantially from ADAM’s predic-
tions, but not from those of a linear-regression time series model.
5. General discussion
Many problems in the world confronting us are related to forecasting and anticipating
events whose actual outcomes have not been observed yet. Although forecasters some-
times review time series retrospectively, commonly forecasters will experience a time ser-
ies of events dynamically in real time. Certainly, most informal everyday forecasting
where we anticipate such things as the daily moods of our boss, our favorite team’s next
game, or the price of beer will be based on dynamically experienced time series. How-
ever, all the studies of judgmental time series forecasting of which we are aware investi-
gate how, when presented with a series of data points, forecasters predict the next event
(s) in the presented series. Specifically, behavioral forecasting time series studies (cf.
Lawrence & O’Connor, 1992) used procedures whereby the events were presented to par-
ticipants as a static time series and respondents engage in multiple forecasts. In contrast,
our method employs both dynamic and static presentations of time series and assesses
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how the accuracy of human forecasting and judgment depends on the presentation mode
(dynamic and static) that is experienced and type of judgment (forecasting and estimation
of the average) in “one-shot” forecast and judgment.
Accordingly and consistent with our results, a number of authors have argued and
empirically established that better probabilistic judgments are made through trial-by-trial
experience (Gigerenzer, Hell, & Blank, 1988; Koehler, 1995; Spellman, 1996). How-
ever, experience did not only influence one type of judgment. We found that judgments
in dynamic mode were different from those in static mode; specifically, they were
anchored on more recent events for both types of judgment (forecasting and estimation
of the average). One significant consequence was that forecasting accuracy was
enhanced, but estimation of average worsened. The increase in forecasting accuracy for
dynamic presentation is due to reduced trend-damping; a possible explanation is that
dynamic presentation draws attention to a smaller subset of more recent events. Accord-
ingly, the experimental findings revealed a fourfold pattern of judgment accuracy, in
which forecasting accuracy (where success accuracy is informed by the most recent
event) is enhanced by dynamically experienced sequences of events but average estima-
tion errors are induced because of recency. In contrast, where events are presented with
static sequences (one simultaneous presentation of all values of a series), forecasting
errors are induced (drawing the respondents’ attention on the “average” event with
insufficient adjustment to the most recent event) but average estimation accuracy is
enhanced.
The modeling results revealed an excellent fit between response data and ADAM’s pre-
dictions. With kp = .04, none of the differences between response data and model
(ADAM) predictions for both forecasting and judgment (average estimation) were signifi-
cant. The results revealed evidence for the advantage for the simulation with model
parameter kp = .04 (representing a degree of individual variability). Given that fit
between model and data was substantially better with kp = .04 than with kp = 0 (without
Gaussian noise), kp = .04 was used in further assessment of model predictions.
In addition, when model fit was further assessed, the results established that a linear-
regression time series model that describes the trend that is presented and generates the
predicted next trend value is a poor model of respondents’ forecasts and judgments. Simi-
larly, the results also revealed a lack of fit between, on the one hand, Box–Jenkins
(ARIMA; Box et al., 1994) and exponential-smoothing models and, on the other hand,
behavioral forecasting data. Moreover, we compared model predictions of ADAM,
ARIMA, and exponential smoothing. We found that ADAM’s prediction differs signifi-
cantly from those of ARIMA and exponential smoothing, but ARIMA and exponential
smoothing do not differ significantly. Moreover, ADAM accounts for the difference
between processing sequences of dynamically and statically presented stimuli (visually
presented data). In contrast to the ARIMA and exponential smoothing models, ADAM
also accounts for behavioral judgment (non-forecasting) tasks (e.g., average estimations).
ADAM captured how variation in presentation mode produces variation in responses (and
the accuracy of these responses) in both forecasting and judgment tasks.
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The new ADAM proposed and tested in the present article embodies a number of prin-
ciples for human judgments and forecasts: representations of time series and classifica-
tion, similarity and psychologically weighted decision units, intrinsic variability, and
recency. The representation subsystem accounts for presentation model and task in the
judgment of perceptually encountered stimuli. This subsystem maps the external stimulus
environment onto an internal decision space. Statistical analysis of this space explains
why a simple behavioral response classifier is sufficient to account for the judgments and
forecasts in our task. It is of course quite possible that other tasks might require more
complex (e.g., nonlinear) decision classifications. Whether human perceptual judgments
and forecasts may require a nonlinear decision classification is an important open empiri-
cal question largely unaddressed at present. Perhaps human subjects can explore complex
perceptual decision spaces, in which case more complex multilayer models will be neces-
sary. On the other hand, the behavioral response might indicate that the perceptual deci-
sion-making system is restricted to simplified solutions even for problems that require
nonlinear classification formulations for optimal performance.
Research on judgment and behavioral forecasting has argued that (a) rational and adap-
tive heuristics (e.g., Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2009) or
(b) “effort reduction” irrational heuristics (e.g., Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993; Shah
& Oppenheimer, 2008; Tversky, 1972; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) underlie behavior
(and accuracy) for judgments and forecasting. For example, W€ubben and von Wangen-
heim (2008) explored the beneficial effect of recency (buying behavior) on forecasting
accuracy. Relying only on recency heuristic (simple and more accurate than the Pareto
negative binomial distribution model;3 also see Schmittlein, Morrison, & Colombo,
1987), forecasters are more accurate by ignoring information such as the frequency of
previous purchases. Yet previous research did not explore systematically these assump-
tions across judgment and behavioral forecasting tasks, taking into account type of expe-
rience. Accordingly, in our argument, the way information is psychologically weighted
depends on the (combination of) modes (presentation and task) in which the information
that forms the basis for the judgment was acquired. Indeed, we found that human judg-
ments are informed by presentation mode and judgment tasks with different consequences
for prediction accuracy in behavioral forecasts and average estimations.
6. Conclusion
Given the theoretical and practical significance of the process and accuracy of people’s
judgment of numerical sequential information, future research should investigate how
responses to experienced events and responses to described events differ in real-life set-
tings. Our model of adaptive anchoring (ADAM) provides a flexible vehicle for modeling
this judgment, and we look forward to its wider application and further development to
account for judgments across contexts.
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Notes
1. Typically, respondents are given a summary description of each option, including
the likelihoods of the different payoffs.
2. Furthermore, as expected, the model of (2) performed worse when kp = 0 instead
of .04.
3. According to a Poisson process, in which purchases and dropouts are distributed
according to a gamma distribution (W€ubben & von Wangenheim, 2008).
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